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PREVIEW; State v. LaFournaise** 
Brian Hagan* 
**Editor’s Note: This preview discusses potentially triggering 
material involving sexual violence. 
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in State v. 
LaFournaise on Wednesday, December 8, 2021 at 9:30 am via Zoom.1 
Chad Wright is expected to appear on behalf of defendant and appellant, 
Toston Gray LaFournaise. Austin Miles Knudsen, Katie F. Schulz, Leo 
Gallagher, and Katie Jerstad are expected to appear on behalf of plaintiff 
and appellee, the State of Montana. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Toston Gray LaFournaise appeals from his conviction under 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503 (2015), sexual intercourse without consent, 
in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County.2 State v. 
LaFournaise is a cautionary tale on the importance of knowing which law 
applies in a criminal case based on the date of the offense. The Montana 
Supreme Court will review: (i) whether an amendment to the information 
during LaFournaise’s trial was one of substance or form;3 and (ii) whether 
harmless error occurred where the jury instructions failed to require a 
finding of force.4 For the reasons discussed below, I anticipate an 
affirmation of LaFournaise’s conviction by the Court. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
LaFournaise began sexually harassing a child named S.S. when he 
was in seventh grade and she was in sixth.5 He left her unwelcome notes, 
inappropriately touched her buttocks, and forced kisses upon her.6 S.S. 
filed four formal complaints with the school. S.S.’s parents, aware of the 
situation, met with school administration, who suspended LaFournaise 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law Class of 2023. 
1 The argument will be live-streamed and can be accessed through the Court's website at  
http://strearn.vision.net/MT-JUD/. 
2 Brief of Appellant at 6, State v. LaFournaise, No. DA 19-0453 (Mont. May 12, 2021) 
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/ getDocByCTrackId?DocId=353285. 
3 Id. at 1; See generally City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 46 P.3d 602 (Mont. 2002).  
4 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 1; See generally City of Missoula v. Zerbst, 462 P.3d 1219 
(Mont. 2020).  
5 Brief of Appellee at 2, State v. LaFournaise, No. DA 19-0453 (Mont. Aug. 11, 2021), 
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=36245. 
6 Id. at 3. 
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three times for his acts. Even after LaFournaise moved on to high school, 
S.S. found a new note from him on her locker.7  
In the fall of 2015, as S.S. walked home from volleyball practice, 
LaFournaise rode up to her on his bicycle, jumped off, and pushed her to 
the ground.8 He told her he was going to hurt her. She screamed for him 
to get off her. He pinned her arms above her head with one hand, and with 
the other pulled down S.S.’s and his own shorts. He inserted his penis into 
her vagina and raped her. He then cut a wound on her leg with a knife and 
told her that he would kill her if she told anyone. Because she believed 
him, she did not initially report the rape.9  
LaFournaise continued to call S.S. in the summer of 2016 until 
she blocked his number.10 Somehow, in 2017, the telephone unblocked 
LaFournaise’s number, and he was able to call her again. He told her that 
he planned to rape her again and impregnate her, and that he “knew where 
to find her.”11 S.S.’s terror and anxiety resulting from this phone call led 
her to reveal the rape to her parents and school officials.12  
On May 24, 2018, the State charged LaFournaise with sexual 
intercourse without consent (Count I), misdemeanor privacy in 
communications (Count II), and misdemeanor stalking (Count III).13 
Before trial, the State amended the information twice, first to add a penalty 
enhancement to Count I due to bodily injury, and then to amend the charge 
to aggravated sexual intercourse without consent.14 
The problem noticed by the district court on the first day of trial 
was that the crime of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent did 
not exist until 2017.15 The offense occurred in the fall of 2015, making the 
2015 Montana Code the governing law.16 Over the objection of the 
defense, the court allowed an amendment to the information reverting to 
the original charge of sexual intercourse without consent.17 
 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 4. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 5. 
13 Id. at 6. 
14 Id. at 6–7. 
15 Id. at 7; See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-508 (2017). 
16 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 8; See City of Missoula v. Zerbst, 462 P.3d 1219, 1221 (Mont. 
2020) (citations omitted) (“[T]he law in effect at the time of an alleged offense applies in criminal 
prosecution.”). 
17 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 4–6. 
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Further complicating the matter were jury instructions used for 
Count I (now sexual intercourse without consent) that listed the 2017 
definition of consent.18 The defense did not object to these jury 
instructions.19 The 2017 definition of “consent” required affirmative 
consent indicating a “freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse . . 
. .”20 The 2015 definition of “without consent” required the use of force.21 
On appeal, LaFournaise argues the following: (i) the amendment 
to the information was one of substance, therefore untimely and the Court 
should reverse his conviction;22 and (ii) the missing force element of 
“without consent” in the jury instructions prejudiced his substantial due 
process rights and therefore, under plain error doctrine, the Court should 
reverse his conviction.23 
III. AMENDMENTS OF SUBSTANCE / AMENDMENTS OF FORM 
Proper analysis of LaFournaise’s first argument begins with an 
introduction to informations and their amendments. “An information is a 
written accusation of criminal conduct prepared by a prosecutor in the 
name of the State.”24 The purpose of the information is for criminal 
defendants to be aware of the conduct they are accused of violating so that 
they may prepare a defense.25 An information can be amended in two 
ways—in substance and in form.26  
a. What is an amendment of substance? 
Amendments of substance change the nature or elements of an 
offense, thus requiring different proof or a different defense.27 If a court 
gives leave to file the amendment, the defendant must be arraigned on the 
new charges and given time to prepare a new defense.28 Because of the 
burden of such an amendment on the defense, Montana law prohibits an 
amendment of substance within five days of trial.29 In City of Red Lodge 
v. Kennedy,30 the prosecution initially brought a charge under one subpart 
of the stalking statute, which prohibited “harassing, threatening, or 
 
18 Id. at 6. 
19 Id.  
20
 § 45-5-501 (2017) (amended 2019). 
21 § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019). 
22 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 12–18. 
23 Id. at 18–24. 
24 State v. Scheffer, 230 P.3d 462, 477 (Mont. 2010). 
25 Id. 
26 § 46-11-205 (2021). 
27 City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 46 P.3d 602, 605 (Mont. 2002).  
28 Id. at 604 (citing § 46-11-205 (2001)). 
29 Id. 
30 46 P.3d 602 (Mont. 2002). 
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intimidating the stalked person . . . .”31 On the day of trial, the district court 
gave leave for an amendment that updated the charge to the entire statute, 
now inclusive of the act of “following the stalked person.”32 The 
amendment further invoked another statute to prove that Kennedy’s acts 
were a continuous course of conduct.33 Because the information added 
elements that required a different defense, Kennedy argued the 
amendment was one of substance, and therefore untimely as it was filed 
within five days of trial.34 The Court agreed, noting that under the new 
charges, the jury could find the defendant guilty without reliance on the 
subpart of the stalking statute originally charged. Because the amendment 
of substance was untimely, the Court reversed the conviction.35 
b. What is an amendment of form? 
Amendments of form are ministerial tasks that do not change the 
elements of the crime charged, and therefore do not require different proof 
or a different defense.36 Because an amendment in form does not prejudice 
the substantial rights of a defendant, it may occur any time before the 
verdict or finding is issued.37 In State v. Scheffer,38 a man suspected of 
inserting his fingers into a woman’s vagina without consent slid his fingers 
in and out of his mouth and wiped them on his jeans in anticipation of a 
DNA test. The initial charge filed was tampering with or fabricating 
physical evidence.39 When the results showed that in spite of the 
defendant’s efforts, the test detected the woman’s DNA, the prosecutor 
amended the charge to attempted tampering with or fabricating physical 
evidence.40 Scheffer appealed on the grounds that the amendment was one 
of substance, and untimely.41 The Court disagreed, and found that the 
amendment was of form because tampering with evidence and attempting 
to tamper with evidence both contained the same elements, but for the 
“attempting” language.42  
 
31 Id. at 604 (citing § 45-5-220(1)(b) (2001) (amended 2003, 2019)). 
32 Id. (citing § 45-5-220 (2001) (amended 2003, 2019)). 
33 Id. at 605. 
34 Id. at 604. 
35 Id. 
36 State v. Scheffer, 230 P.3d 462, 477 (Mont. 2010) (citation omitted). 
37 Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-205(3) (2009)). 
38 230 P.3d 462 (Mont. 2010). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 467. 
41 Id. at 477. 
42 Id.  
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c. LaFournaise’s arguments 
Here, LaFournaise claims that the amendment from the 2017 
aggravated sexual intercourse without consent charge to the 2015 sexual 
intercourse without consent charge was an amendment of substance for 
two reasons: (i) “the amendment altered the defense strategy” to move for 
dismissal based on charging error;43 and (ii) “the amendment altered the 
essential consent element.”44 Both arguments are flawed. 
i. A windfall is not a right. 
A defense strategy of hoping for dismissal due to a charging error is 
not a substantial right. In Collins v. Youngblood,45 a defendant was unable 
to capitalize on a Texas common-law rule that would have overturned his 
conviction because he was both sentenced and charged a fine.46 Aware of 
the loophole, the Texas legislature enacted law allowing the fine to be 
deleted, thereby curing the error.47 Youngblood claimed a violation of his 
rights under the ex post facto doctrine because the statute was enacted after 
the commission of his offense.48 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the 
new law inoffensive to the specific protections offered by the doctrine.49 
To wit: the ex post facto doctrine did not shield the defendant from every 
disadvantage arising from post-offense legislation, only violations of 
substantial rights.50 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens added “[t]he mere 
possibility of a capricious and unlikely windfall is not the sort of 
procedural protection that could reasonably be judged substantial . . . .”51  
Here, the substantial right the law protects by limiting amendments is 
the right of the accused to build a defense based on the elements of their 
charges and produce the proof required by that defense.52 Thus, in 
Kennedy, when additional elements of stalking and a continuous course of 
conduct changed the proof necessary to defend, the Court reversed the 
 
43 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 13–15. 
44 Id. at 17. 
45 497 U.S. 37 (1990). 
46 Id. at 39–40. 
47 Id. at 40. 
48 Id. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
49 Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 52 (“The Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does 
not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more 
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of 
any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed.”). 
50 Id. at 52–61 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
51 Id. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring). LaFournaise invokes the ex post facto doctrine several times in 
his brief. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 9, 19. The ex post facto doctrine is immaterial to 
the disposition of this case. The takeaway of the Collins v. Youngblood passages—that a lucky error 
is not a substantial right of the defendant—can apply to many constitutional contexts. Any mention 
of the ex post facto doctrine is coincidental and not a response to LaFournaise’s ex post facto claims. 
52 City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 46 P.3d 602, 604 (Mont. 2002). 
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conviction.53 And in State v. Hardground,54 when the prosecution, on the 
date of trial, altered the date the accused allegedly changed residence (a 
critical element of the crime), the Court reversed the conviction because 
the necessary proof the defense required changed.55 Here, the district court 
did not violate LaFournaise’s substantial rights by depriving him of the 
ability to move for dismissal based on charging error. The court’s decision 
did not interfere with constructing a defense founded on the elements of 
the crime. Nor did this decision alter the proof required to defend against 
the elements of the crime. It simply deprived him of the “capricious 
windfall” considered by Justice Stevens in Youngblood. Consequently, it 
offended no constitutional or statutory protection.56  
ii. The amendment, by definition, was one of form. 
The amendment to Count I of the information was one of form, 
because the elements of the crimes before and after were identical. In 
LaFournaise’s second argument, he confuses the analysis between 
amendments of substance and form by subsuming his jury instruction 
complaint into the comparison.57 He begins by discussing the confirmation 
between the State and the district court that the pre- and post-amendment 
crimes shared identical elements.58 He then detours into discussing the 
2017 definition of consent’s appearance in the jury instructions.59 Jury 
instructions are irrelevant in the determination of whether an amendment 
is of form or substance because the analysis compares statutory elements.60 
Implicit support for this proposition exists in the statute itself, as 
amendments of substance require an “arraignment on the amended 
information.”61 An arraignment on jury instructions, erroneous or not, is a 
non-sequitur. The analysis of the amendment must instead compare the 
previously charged statute, aggravated sexual intercourse without consent 
§ 45-5-508 (2017) with sexual intercourse without consent § 45-5-503(1) 
(2015).62 
 
53 Id. at 605. 
54 433 P.3d 711 (Mont. 2019). 
55 Id. at 711–12, 714–15 (“Although an amendment to the date in an information might ordinarily 
constitute an amendment of form . . . here, the number of days a sexual or violent offender has to 
provide notice to the proper authorities of change of residence is an element of the offense charged . 
. . .”). 
56 Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
57 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 17.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 17–18. 
60 See State v. Yecovenko, 95 P.3d 145, 149 (Mont. 2004) (statutes are the same so amendment is of 
form). Cf. City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 46 P.3d 602, 605 (Mont. 2002) (comparing full stalking 
statute and continuous course of conduct statute to one subpart of stalking statute and finding 
amendment of substance).  
61 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-205 (2021). 
62 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
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§ 45-5-508 (2017) § 45-5-503(1) (2015) 
A person who uses force while 
knowingly having sexual 
intercourse with another person 
without consent or with another 
person who is incapable of 
consent commits the offense of 
aggravated sexual intercourse 
without consent. 
A person who knowingly has 
sexual intercourse without 
consent with another person 
commits the offense of sexual 
intercourse without consent.  
 § 45-5-501 (2015) 
 (1) (a) As used in 45-5-503, the 
term "without consent" means: (i) 
the victim is compelled to submit 
by force against the victim or 
another . . . . 
The elements of the pre- and post-amendment statutes are identical. 
The only difference is where the force element exists. Because the 
elements of both crimes are the same, the amendment was one of form.63 
Because the amendment was one of form, the amendment was timely as it 
was effectuated before the verdict issued.64 
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Because they listed the 2017 definition of consent, the jury 
instructions provided in Lewis and Clark County contained a misstatement 
of the law.65 LaFournaise correctly notes that the 2017 definition of 
consent does not include the force element required in 2015.66 
a. Plain error review is appropriate. 
Plain error doctrine review is appropriate because the defense’s claims 
implicate his substantial rights of due process. LaFournaise did not object 
to the jury instructions at trial.67 The Montana Supreme Court “generally 
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal when the 
appellant had the opportunity to make an objection at trial.”68 However, 
the Court will review claims of error on appeal when they may “(1) result 
in a manifest miscarriage of justice; (2) leave unsettled the question of the 
 
63 State v. Scheffer, 230 P.3d 462, 477 (Mont. 2010). 
64 § 46-11-205; Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
65 § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019); Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 1. 
66 § 45-5-501 (2017) (amended 2019); § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019); Brief of Appellant, 
supra note 2, at 6. 
67 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 6. 
68 State v. Daniels, 448 P.3d 511, 518 (Mont. 2019). 
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fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings; or (3) compromise the 
integrity of the judicial process.”69 Claims concerning whether the State 
properly instructed the jury on its burden of proof directly implicate the 
fundamental fairness of the trial and thus qualify for plain error review.70 
In State v. Daniels, the Court held that the defendant did not meet the 
burden of convincing them plain error review was necessary,71 because the 
jury instructions the defendant complained of were unrelated to the counts 
the jury ultimately convicted him on.72  
Here, plain error review is appropriate because LaFournaise’s 
conviction rests on jury instructions whose language neglected to express 
the force element of “without consent.”73 A basic tenet of a criminal 
defendant’s due process rights is that “every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime” must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.74 Without such a 
standard, we risk “leav[ing] people in doubt that innocent men are being 
condemned.”75  
b. Improper jury instructions can be reversible error. 
LaFournaise cites several cases where the Court overturned 
convictions secured with incomplete jury instructions.76 In all of these 
cases, the jury instructions provided an opportunity for the jury to convict 
without finding an element the State had a burden to prove.77 
In City of Missoula v. Zerbst, another jury instruction mix-up occurred 
where a man defended himself against a sexual assault charge involving 
an “on-and-off again” romantic interest.78 The alleged offense occurred in 
July 2017, when the 2015 Montana Code governed.79 The instructions, 
however, provided the 2017 definition of consent which included a new 
bar to consent in situations where the victim suffered a mental disorder.80 
The alleged victim in Zerbst had a history of mental disease.81 The State’s 
burden under 2015 law was to prove “without consent” under the ordinary 
 
69 Id. at 519 (citations omitted). 
70 Id. (citations omitted). 
71 Id. at 520. 
72 Id. 
73 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019); Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 
23–24. 
74 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  
75 Id. 
76 Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 20–23. See generally City of Missoula v. Zerbst, 462 P.3d 
1219 (Mont. 2020); State v. Resh, 448 P.3d 1100 (Mont. 2019); State v. Carnes, 346 P.3d 1120 
(Mont. 2015). 
77 Zerbst, 462 P.3d at 1226; Resh, 448 P.3d at 1105; Carnes, 346 P.3d at 1123. 
78 Zerbst, 462 P.3d at 1220–22. 
79 Id. at 1221–22. 
80 Id. at 1222 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(b)(i) (2017) (amended 2019)). 
81 Id. at 1223. 
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meaning of those words.82 Because the jury could incorrectly presume a 
lack of consent due to mental disorder, the Court reversed the conviction.83 
In State v. Resh,84 the jury instructions, without objection, stated that 
a person was incapable of consent to sexual assault if under the age of 
sixteen.85 The law, however, provided for consent in persons aged fourteen 
or older.86 The alleged victim, at the time of the offense, was fourteen years 
old.87 Again in Resh, jury instructions that erroneously stated the law 
offered an opportunity to convict without finding an element of the crime: 
lack of consent.88 Consequently, the Court reversed on ineffective counsel 
grounds.89 
In State v. Carnes,90 a man charged with assault on a peace officer 
built his defense based on his lack of knowledge that the men he assaulted 
were officers.91 The jury instructions stated the jury only needed to find 
the man’s awareness as to his conduct, not to the fact that the deputies 
were peace officers.92 When the jury asked specifically whether Carnes 
needed to be aware of the deputies’ positions, the district court declined to 
answer and referred them back to the instructions.93 The Montana Supreme 
Court held that this awareness was required, and because the jury had 
opportunity to convict Carnes without finding it, questions of the 
“fundamental fairness of the trial” remained.94 Consequently, the Court 
reversed.95 
c. Harmless Error 
LaFournaise’s case is distinguishable. The common, fatal thread in 
each of the preceding cases is the opportunity the jury had to convict 
without necessarily finding a required element of the crime. Here, despite 
the erroneous jury instructions, the jury could not have convicted 
LaFournaise without finding the required “without consent” element. This 
is because either (i) the jury found S.S. incapable of consent due to 
 
82 Id. at 1226. 
83 Id. 
84 448 P.3d 1100 (Mont. 2019). 
85 Id. at 1102.  
86 Id. at 1104 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(5)(a)(ii) (2013) (amended 2019)). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1105. 
89 Id. 
90 346 P.3d 1120 (Mont. 2015). 
91 Id. at 1123.  
92 Id. at 1122. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1123.  
95 Id. 
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surprise; or (ii) it cannot be possible that the jury found the alleged conduct 
occurred without also finding force occurred. 
If the jury found S.S. incapable of consent due to surprise, the State 
met their burden of proving “without consent.”96 In 2001, the Montana 
legislature added deception, coercion, and surprise as bars to consent in 
response to the reversal of a sexual intercourse without consent conviction 
in State v. Haser.97 In Haser, the defendant, a professional photographer, 
used the pretext of adjusting models’ poses as reason for placing his hands 
under their attire and incidentally penetrating their vaginas with his 
fingers.98 The State argued that the surprise of these attacks should satisfy 
the force requirement of “without consent” because the victims had no 
opportunity to offer consent before penetration.99 The Court found no 
language in the statute to support such an argument and they reversed the 
conviction.100 Because the legislature added “surprise” in response to this 
holding,101 the facts of Haser suggest the type of acts contemplated by the 
amendment—acts where penetration is the source of surprise.102 The State, 
in its brief, considers it a likely outcome that the jury found S.S. was 
incapable of consent due to the surprise of LaFournaise’s attack.103 The 
period of time between LaFournaise’s arrival on his bicycle and 
penetration expands the boundaries of immediacy drawn by Haser, but 
lacking a definition in either the statute or the jury instructions, the jury 
certainly could determine what “surprise” meant to them and whether they 
found it.104 If they did find it, the State proved the “without consent” 
element of the crime.105 Either way, as explained below, the jury found 
force. 
The Constitution does not guarantee an error-free trial, and the Court 
will rightly ignore errors found to be harmless.106  “[I]n the absence of 
error that renders a trial fundamentally unfair . . . a conviction should be 
affirmed where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial 
 
96 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2015) (current version at § 45-5-501(1)(b)(iii) (2021)). 
97 20 P.3d 100 (Mont. 2001); § 45-5-501(1)(b)(iii); John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still 
Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual 
Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1141–42 (2011). 
98 Haser, 20 P.3d at 102–03. 
99 Id. at 107, 109. 
100 Id. at 110. 
101 Decker & Baroni, supra note 97, at 1141–42. 
102 Haser, 20 P.3d at 103, 107. 
103 Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 29. 
104 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019); Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 
3, 23–24. 
105 § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019). 
106 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1983). 
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established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”107 In Pope v. Illinois,108 
members of the jury were instructed to find whether “allegedly obscene 
magazines” violated a community standard of value when the correct test 
required an objective reasonable person standard.109 The Court held that 
the error in the instructions was harmless if no rational juror could have 
found the magazines of no value under one test without finding similarly 
under the other.110 In Rose v. Clark,111 a Tennessee court improperly 
instructed the jury that they could presume malice, a necessary element, 
by the mere existence of a homicide.112 Such presumptions were (and are) 
unconstitutional because they remove the prosecutor’s burden of proving 
an element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.113 The Clark Court, 
however, found that such an error could be harmless if a reviewing court 
could find malice in the predicate facts.114 It stated “[i]n many cases, the 
predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could 
find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not 
intend to cause injury.”115 It recognized that inference based on conduct is 
often the necessary path a jury takes to reach intent.116 The Montana 
Supreme Court, in State v. Scarborough,117 found harmless error where an 
erroneous jury instruction “could have had no effect on the outcome of the 
trial.”118  
These principles apply to LaFournaise because the “force” necessary 
for conviction was built-in to the conduct found by the jury. LaFournaise 
“jumped off his bicycle and grabbed S.S. from behind.”119 LaFournaise 
“pushed S.S. down and told her he was going to hurt her.” He repeatedly 
told her “You need to be quiet” as she “screamed for him to get off her.” 
He “pinned S.S.’s hands/arms above her head with his left hand and pulled 
her shorts down with his right hand.” He “took down his own shorts and 
positioned his knees between S.S.’s legs and inserted his penis into her 
vagina.”120 Just as in Pope, no rational juror could have found these acts 
occurred and not found force. Just as in Clark, the predicate facts 
 
107 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502–03 (1987) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
108 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
109 Id. at 503; Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
110 Pope, 481 U.S. at 503. 
111 478 U.S. 570 (1986). 
112 Id. at 574–75. 
113 See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
114 Clark, 478 U.S. at 580. 
115 Id. at 580–81. 
116 Id. at 581. 
117 14 P.3d 1202 (Mont. 2001). 
118 Id. at 1214. 
119 Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 3.  
120 Id. 
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conclusively establish force. And just as in Scarborough, the error 
omitting force cannot possibly have influenced the outcome of the trial, 
because force is so manifestly implicit in everything LaFournaise did. 
Because the jury instruction error did not prejudice the outcome of 
LaFournaise’s trial, the error was harmless.121  
V. CONCLUSION 
Because the amendment of form to Count I was timely, and because 
the error omitting a required finding of force from the jury instructions 
was harmless, I anticipate the Montana Supreme Court will affirm 
LaFournaise’s conviction of sexual intercourse without consent. 
 
121 City of Missoula v. Zerbst, 462 P.3d 1219, 1224 (Mont. 2020) (citing State v. Scarborough, 14 
P.3d 1202 (Mont. 2001)). 
